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Abstract 
Mentalizing is a fundamental process underpinning human social interaction. Claims of 
the existence of ‘implicit mentalizing’ represent a fundamental shift in our 
understanding of this important skill, suggesting that preverbal infants and even 
animals may be capable of mentalizing. One of the most influential tasks supporting 
such claims in adults is the dot perspective-taking task, but demonstrations of similar 
performance on this task for mentalistic and non-mentalistic stimuli have led to the 
suggestion that this task in fact measures domain-general processes, rather than 
implicit mentalizing. A mentalizing explanation was supported by fMRI data claiming to 
show greater activation of brain areas involved in mentalizing, including right 
temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), when participants made self-perspective judgements 
in a mentalistic, but not in a non-mentalistic condition, an interpretation subsequently 
challenged. Here we provide the first causal test of the mentalizing claim using 
disruptive transcranial magnetic stimulation of rTPJ during self-perspective 
judgements. We found no evidence for a distinction between mentalistic and non-
mentalistic stimuli: stimulation of rTPJ impaired performance on all self-perspective 
trials, regardless of the mentalistic/non-mentalistic nature of the stimulus. Our data 
support a domain-general attentional interpretation of performance on the dot 
perspective-taking task, a role which is subserved by the rTPJ.  
 
 
Keywords: Automatic attentional orienting; attentional pop-out; dot 
perspective-taking task; implicit mentalizing; perspective-taking; sub-mentalizing; 
temporoparietal junction; repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. 
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Mentalizing, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, is a 
fundamental process underpinning human social interaction.  Although generally 
assumed to be an explicit process, requiring conscious thought and cognitive flexibility, 
there have been recent claims that mentalizing can also be implicit - that it is a fast and 
efficient process that occurs automatically, without conscious awareness (Apperly, 
2011; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, Frith & Frith, 2012).  Claims of implicit mentalizing 
represent a fundamental shift in our understanding of this important skill, with 
suggestions that it is present in pre-linguistic infants (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; 
Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) and in a variety of social animals (e.g. Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978; Call, 2012; Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call & Tomasello, 2016) – 
although, for contrasting views see De Bruin and Newen (2012), Heyes (2014a, 2014b, 
2017), Penn and Povinelli (2007), Perner and Ruffman (2005), Phillips et al. (2015), and 
Ruffman, Taumoepeau and Perkins (2012).  
Recent studies have spurred controversy by claiming that implicit mentalizing 
persists in adulthood. Evidence for this claim comes from visual perspective-taking 
studies using a paradigm known as the ‘dot perspective-taking task’ (henceforth ‘the 
dots task’; e.g. Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010; 
McCleery, Surtees, Graham, Richards, & Apperly, 2011; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 
2010).   
In the dots task, participants are presented with a word cue indicating whether 
they will be required to adopt their own perspective (“YOU”: ‘self-perspective’ trials) 
or someone else’s (“SHE”/“HE”: ‘non-self-perspective’ trials), before the appearance 
of a number cue (0-3), followed by a picture of a room containing large circles/dots 
pinned on the wall.  In the centre of the room, there is a human-like figure or avatar 
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facing either the left or right wall. The participant’s task is to verify if the cued number 
corresponds to the number of dots that they (self-perspective trials) or the avatar 
(non-self-perspective trials) can see.  Depending on the location of the dots, 
sometimes the number of dots that can be seen is the same for both participant and 
avatar (consistent trials), whereas sometimes the number of dots is different across 
the two perspectives (inconsistent trials); see Figure 1. A robust finding from all 
previous studies using this task is that participants’ responses are slower in 
inconsistent compared to consistent trials.  Furthermore, this effect is found even 
when participants make judgements on self-perspective trials and thus do not need to 
take into account the avatar’s perspective. This ‘self-consistency effect’ has been 
interpreted as evidence of implicit mentalizing: participants automatically adopt the 
other person’s perspective and seem unable to ignore it, even when they are only 
required to adopt their own perspective (Samson et al., 2010).  However, the implicit 
mentalizing interpretation has been criticized because the task lacked a non-
mentalistic control condition.  When such controls are included (e.g. Cole, Atkinson, Le 
& Smith, 2016; Conway, Lee, Ojaghi, Catmur & Bird, 2017; Santiesteban, Catmur, 
Coughlan Hopkins, Bird & Heyes, 2014; Schurz et al., 2015), results suggest that 
domain-general attentional processes, rather than a domain-specific process such as 
implicit mentalizing, underlie performance on the task. However, a recent 
neuroimaging study claimed to have found evidence of domain specificity at the 
neural level using the dots task (Schurz et al., 2015).  Schurz and colleagues reported 
greater activation of brain regions generally associated with mentalizing such as rTPJ, 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and ventral precuneus when participants made self-
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perspective judgements in the mentalistic (avatar) but not in the non-mentalistic 
(arrow) condition.   
We recently suggested that neuroimaging methods are ill-suited to address 
claims of implicit mentalizing due to the fact that, under an implicit mentalizing 
account, the presence of a mentalistic stimulus is sufficient to prompt the mentalizing 
process. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether differential activation is caused 
by the stimulus (the avatar), or the process of interest (mentalizing), when contrasted 
with a non-mentalistic stimulus such as an arrow (see Catmur, Santiesteban, Conway, 
Heyes & Bird, 2016). In the present study, we use both behavioural (Experiment 1) and 
brain stimulation (disruptive repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation – rTMS – of 
rTPJ, Experiment 2) methods to provide an empirical test of the claim that rTPJ is 
involved in representing another’s visual perspective during self-perspective 
judgements for mentalistic, but not for non-mentalistic, stimuli.  In both experiments 
all participants completed the dots task in two stimulus conditions, where the central 
stimulus was either mentalistic (avatar) or non-mentalistic (arrow).  Should 
stimulation of rTPJ result in impairment of self-perspective judgements in the avatar 
but not in the arrow condition, this would provide support for the domain-specific 
claim. Conversely, if stimulation of rTPJ fails to distinguish between the avatar and 
arrow trials, this would favour a domain-general attentional interpretation of 
performance on this task.  
Although domain-general accounts of performance on the dots task have been 
proposed, the nature of any such domain-general processes has been relatively under-
specified and, as far as we are aware, no study has provided positive evidence for their 
existence. Consideration of the task demands of the different conditions can help 
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elucidate the nature of any such processes. For example, on self-perspective trials, the 
participant must overcome any attentional cuing effect of the avatar and arrow, and 
re-orient their attention to scan the whole room for the presence of dots (both in 
front of and behind the central stimulus). In contrast, on non-self-perspective trials 
the participant does not need to reorient their attention after it has been allocated to 
the side of the room cued by the central stimulus, as this is the only side that must be 
searched for dots. This analysis would indicate that domain-general processes 
involved in attentional reorienting should be required on self-perspective, but not on 
non-self-perspective trials. Another possibility is that the saliency of the dots makes 
them ‘pop-out’ compared to the background. On self-perspective trials, participants 
could use attentional processes in combination with this pop-out effect to select all 
the dots, following which the number of dots would be automatically subitized 
(Sathian et al., 1999). The use of attentional selection to profit from this ‘pop-out and 
subitization’ process would be helpful on self-perspective trials, as it would result in 
the correct number of dots being identified; but on non-self-perspective trials, such 
attentional selection of all red dots would be counterproductive. Again, this analysis 
indicates that different domain-general attentional processes would be involved on 
self-perspective than on non-self-perspective trials. 
Crucially, previous fMRI studies using the dots task have reported stronger 
activation of rTPJ for self- than for non-self-perspective judgements (Ramsey, Hansen, 
Apperly & Samson, 2013; Schurz et al., 2015); a finding which is consistent with the 
task-demand analyses above, given that the TPJ has a well-documented role in certain 
domain-general attentional processes including attentional reorienting and visual pop-
out (Buschman & Miller, 2007; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Ellison, Schindler, Pattison, 
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& Milner, 2004; Geng & Vossel, 2013; Pollmann et al., 2003), but not in others such as 
endogenous orienting of attention (Thiel, Zilles & Fink, 2004). Therefore, a domain-
general attentional account of performance on this task would be supported by data 
whereby stimulation of rTPJ fails to distinguish between mentalistic and non-
mentalistic trials during self-perspective judgements, yet selectively affects self-
perspective trials compared to non-self-perspective trials.  
 
Experiment 1 
The aim of this behavioural experiment was to a) replicate our previous findings 
(Santiesteban et al., 2014) that the consistency effect – faster responding for 
consistent than inconsistent trials – is also elicited by a non-mentalistic, but 
directional, object such as an arrow; and b) verify that optimising the number of trials 
for the rTMS study, by inclusion of mismatching trials (see methods below), does not 
eliminate the consistency effect for either self- or non-self-perspective judgements. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen healthy adults (10 males; age range:  18 – 47 years, M = 24.6, SD = 7.6) 
volunteered to take part in this study.  Fifteen were right-handed. Since performance 
of the left-handed participant did not differ from the group mean, their data were 
included in the reported analysis.   
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Figure 1 shows examples of the stimuli presented to participants.  The image files 
were those used by Samson et al. (2010) and Santiesteban et al. (2014). The central 
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stimulus was either an avatar or an arrow. There was a male and a female avatar 
(presented to male and female participants, respectively), and two arrows with colour 
palettes and colour distributions matched to those of the male and female avatars.  
The arrows also matched the avatars in height (5.840 of visual angle) and area.  
 
Figure 1. Examples of the stimuli.  The avatar and arrow trials were either consistent 
(1a, 2a) or inconsistent (1b, 2b) with the participant’s perspective.  
 
Details of the task procedure are described in Samson et al. (2010, Experiment 1) 
and Santiesteban et al. (2014).  As described in the Introduction, participants were 
required to verify if a previously seen number cue corresponded to the number of dots 
displayed in the stimulus picture either from their own visual perspective (self-
perspective trials), the avatar’s perspective (non-self-perspective avatar trials), or to 
which the arrow was pointing (non-self-perspective arrow trials).  Participants made 
their responses by pressing 1 for ‘yes’ if the number cue matched the announced 
perspective/ arrow pointing and 2 for ‘no’ if these did not match.  Trial types were 
defined not only by the perspective participants were asked to verify (self, non-self 
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avatar, non-self arrow) but also by whether the avatar’s perspective / arrow pointing 
was consistent or inconsistent with the participant’s perspective (see Figure 1). 
In previous studies using the dots task, the data from those trials where the 
participant’s response should be ‘no’ (mismatching trials) were not included in any 
reported analyses. This is because of a disparity in the experimental design. In 
consistent ‘no’ trials the number cue displayed was irrelevant to both perspectives. For 
example, if both the avatar and participant could see (or the arrow was pointing 
towards) 2 dots, the number cue was either 1 or 3. The inconsistent ‘no’ trials, 
however, displayed a number cue representing the inverse perspective.  For example, 
if the participant could see 2 dots and the avatar could see (or the arrow was pointing 
towards) only 1, the number cue in the ‘no’ trial would always represent the inverse 
perspective, being either 1 for self-perspective or 2 for non-self-perspective 
judgements.  
In order to optimize the experimental design for use in the rTMS study 
(Experiment 2), it was crucial to be able to include all trial types in analysis. This was in 
order to keep the number of TMS pulses within acceptable tolerance and safety limits: 
discarding data from half of the experimental trials would have entailed delivering 
twice as many TMS pulses. Therefore, we modified the inconsistent ‘no’ trials so that 
the number cue was irrelevant to both perspectives, as it was in the consistent ‘no’ 
trials. Hence, when the participant could see 2 dots but the avatar could see (or the 
arrow was pointing towards) only 1, the number cue was 3.  This modification allowed 
us to collapse across matching (yes) and mismatching (no) trials.  Also for design 
optimization for rTMS, the filler trials (where no dots were displayed) included in the 
study by Samson et al. (2010) were excluded from this experiment, and the number 
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cue was never 0. Experiment 1 therefore tested whether the consistency effect was 
still present for self-perspective and non-self-perspective judgements when these 
minor alterations were made to the procedure.  
There were 4 consecutive blocks of trials for each stimulus condition (avatar and 
arrow) and each block consisted of 48 trials. The order of stimulus condition was 
counterbalanced across participants. The experimental trials for each stimulus 
condition were preceded by 26 practice trials.  Accuracy feedback was given during 
practice trials only. In half of the experimental trials the avatar/arrow pointed to the 
left and in half it pointed to the right. Half of the trials required a ‘yes’ response and 
half required a ‘no’ response. Response time was measured from the onset of the 
stimulus picture.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Due to the small percentage of errors (3.8% in total) we did not submit these 
data to any statistical analyses. The response time (RT) data were analysed with a 2 × 
2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Stimulus (avatar, arrow), Perspective 
(self, non-self) and Consistency (consistent, inconsistent). Trials for which RTs were 
more than 2 standard deviations from the mean (0.6%) and incorrect responses (3.8%) 
were excluded from the analysis.  
Figure 2 illustrates the mean RT for each of the conditions and trial types. The 
analysis revealed that after collapsing the matching (‘yes’ response) and mismatching 
(‘no’ response) trials, the main effect of Consistency was significant, F(1,15) = 54.93; p < 
.001; η2p= .79.  RTs were longer in inconsistent (M = 618 ms, S.E.M. = 29) than in 
consistent (M = 581 ms, S.E.M. = 29) trials. The main effect of Perspective was also 
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significant, F(1,15) = 12.90; p = .003; η
2
p= .46.  Participants responded faster to self (M = 
585ms, S.E.M. = 30) than to non-self trials (M = 614ms, S.E.M. = 29). Consistent with 
our previous study, neither the main effect of Stimulus (p = .187) nor any of its 
interactions were significant (all ps > .250).    
This pattern of results was replicated when we performed a mixed analysis with 
Stimulus as a between-subjects factor, taking into account only the first stimulus 
condition.  In this analysis we found a main effect of Consistency (F(1,14) = 19.93; p = 
.001; η2p= .59), a main effect of Perspective (F(1,14) = 10.82; p = .005; η
2
p= .44), but no 
main effect of Stimulus (p = .836). The only significant interaction was that between 
Perspective × Consistency; (F(1,14) = 5.41; p = .036; η
2
p= .28). Post-hoc analysis showed 
that while self-perspective judgements (M = 588ms, S.E.M. = 29) were faster than non-
self-perspective judgements (M = 637ms, S.E.M. = 30) in the consistent trials (p < 
.001), this comparison was not significant in the inconsistent trials (self: M = 631ms, 
S.E.M. = 32; non-self: M = 658ms, S.E.M. = 31; p = .12). This mixed analysis confirms 
our previous results (Santiesteban et al., 2014) that the consistency effect seen in the 
arrow condition is not due to participants’ exposure to the avatar condition.  
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Figure 2. Mean RT for each of the trial types. The light bars represent consistent and 
the dark bars represent inconsistent trials. The error bars illustrate within-subject 
S.E.M.  
 
The results from Experiment 1 confirmed that inclusion of the mismatching (‘no’ 
response) trials in the analysis did not eliminate the consistency or the perspective 
effects. This pattern of results gave us the confidence to include this trial type in 
Experiment 2, allowing us to optimize the design for rTMS and include all experimental 
trials in the analysis. Crucially, the results from Experiment 1 also support our previous 
findings (Santiesteban et al., 2014) that an arrow is just as effective as a human-like 
figure to elicit the consistency effect.  
 
Experiment 2 
The main objective of Experiment 2 was to determine whether the role of the 
rTPJ in the dots task (Ramsey et al., 2013; Schurz et al., 2015) is to support mentalizing 
during self-perspective trials with mentalistic stimuli, or to support domain-general 
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attentional processes on self-perspective trials. Accordingly, participants completed 
both avatar and arrow conditions of the dots task while undergoing rTMS stimulation 
(see Methods) to either the rTPJ, or a control mid-occipital site. The two hypotheses 
concerning rTPJ function during the dots task make opposing predictions. If rTPJ 
supports mentalizing during self-perspective trials then one would expect a selective 
effect of rTPJ stimulation (when compared to stimulation of the mid-occipital control 
site) only for trials with mentalistic stimuli (avatar trials). Conversely, if rTPJ supports 
attentional processes such as visual pop-out or reorienting that are required on self-
perspective but not non-self-perspective trials, then one would expect a selective 
effect of rTPJ stimulation on self-perspective trials (both arrow and avatar), but not on 
non-self-perspective trials.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Nineteen healthy adults (12 females) were recruited to take part in this study 
for a small monetary reward. Age ranged between 19 and 42 years (M = 24.9, SD = 
6.0). We screened all participants to ensure that there were no contraindications to 
TMS. Prior to the experimental session, structural T1-weighted MRI scans were 
obtained to aid localization of the targeted regions. All participants provided written 
informed consent prior to the study. The experimental procedures were approved by 
the local ethics committee and were carried out in accordance with the principles of 
the revised Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Associations General Assembly 2008).  
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Stimuli and Procedure 
The stimuli and procedure replicated those of Experiment 1. A within-subjects 
design was employed, with each participant undergoing stimulation of both the rTPJ 
and a control site in the mid occipital cortex (MOC). However, for safety reasons we 
had to reduce the number of trials from the total presented in Experiment 1.  The task 
consisted of 48 trials per stimulus type (avatar/arrow) for each of the stimulation sites 
(rTPJ/MOC), therefore, each participant completed 192 experimental trials in total. 
Stimulus type was blocked within each stimulation site. Both the order of stimulation 
site (rTPJ or MOC) and of stimulus type (avatar or arrow) were counterbalanced across 
participants. 
TMS Protocol 
Prior to the experiment, the structural MRI scans were manually registered to 
the standard MNI-152 template in the Brainsight2 neuronavigation system (Rogue 
Research, Montreal, Canada) and stimulation targets set using predefined MNI 
coordinates (rTPJ = 54, −47, 26; MOC = 0, −95, 26; Figure 3). Right TPJ coordinates 
were taken from Sowden and Catmur (2013), who demonstrated a disruptive effect of 
rTMS to rTPJ on social cognitive function. Appropriate trajectories of stimulation were 
set for each individual, and landmarks were set on the surface reconstruction of the 
participant’s head. 
Before the experiment began, each participant’s resting motor threshold (rMT) 
was identified, defined as the lowest intensity of stimulation required to elicit motor 
evoked potentials (MEPs) of at least 50 μV in the first dorsal interosseous muscle in 
the right hand, on 3 out of 5 trials. MEPs were recorded using surface skin electrodes 
and Brain Vision software (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). 
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The participant’s head was then registered in the neuronavigation system using 
an infrared camera and participant tracker. Repetitive TMS (6 pulses at 10 Hz per trial) 
was delivered using a figure-of-eight coil and a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator (The 
Magstim Company, Whitland, UK) at 110% of each participant’s rMT.  Participants 
received the stimulation 100ms after stimulus scene onset, ensuring that the 
disruptive effects of rTMS were present throughout the response preparation period 
identified in Experiment 1. The location of the coil with respect to the target site was 
monitored online, allowing precise coil location to be maintained throughout the 
experiment. The TMS coil was replaced and re-calibrated between stimulation sites, or 
if the stimulator indicated overheating of the coil. The experimental trials for each 
stimulation site and stimulus condition were preceded by 13 practice trials with rTMS, 
in order to familiarise participants with the sensation of rTMS to each site during the 
task. Accuracy feedback was given during practice trials only.  
 
Figure 3. Graphical illustration of the rTMS targeted brain areas. MNI coordinates: rTPJ 
54, −47, 26; MOC = 0, −95, 26. 
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Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, participants made very few errors (1.5%), and therefore 
the error data were not submitted to further statistical analysis. Trials for which RTs 
were more than 2 standard deviations from the mean (0.2%) and incorrect responses 
(1.5%) were excluded from the analysis. 
In order to address our experimental question of whether rTMS of rTPJ would 
impair self-perspective judgements in the avatar but not in the arrow condition, we 
first analysed the RT data from the self-perspective trials using a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with Stimulation Site (rTPJ, MOC), Stimulus Type (avatar, arrow), 
and Consistency (consistent, inconsistent) as the within-subjects factors. The RT data 
are shown in Figure 4.  Our results replicated the key finding from studies using the 
dots task with faster responses for consistent (M = 598ms, S.E.M. = 29) than for 
inconsistent trials (M = 655ms, S.E.M. = 35); F(1,18) = 21.41; p < .001; η
2
p= .54. There 
was also a main effect of stimulation site, F(1,18) = 4.60; p = .046; η
2
p= .20: responding 
was slower for self-perspective trials following stimulation of rTPJ (M = 651ms, S.E.M. 
= 38) compared to MOC (M = 602ms, S.E.M. = 28). Crucially, we did not find either a 3-
way interaction between stimulation site, stimulus type and consistency, F(1,18) = .035; 
p = .853; η2p= .002, or a 2-way interaction between stimulation site and stimulus type, 
F(1,18) = .871; p = .363; η
2
p= .046, demonstrating that stimulation of rTPJ did not 
selectively impair self-perspective judgements in the avatar condition. In order to 
establish the strength of evidence for the null hypothesis of no interaction between 
stimulation site and stimulus type, Bayes Factors were calculated using JASP 
(https://jasp-stats.org/; JASP Team, 2016). JASP default priors were used as model for 
H1. A Bayes Factor of 0.015 was associated with the inclusion of the 3-way interaction 
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into a model containing the main effects and all constituent 2-way interactions. For 
the 2-way interaction (which is present in multiple possible models), Bayesian model 
averaging revealed a Bayes Factor of 0.160 when comparing all models containing the 
Stimulation Site × Stimulus Type interaction to all other candidate models. Thus for 
both the 3-way and 2-way interactions, the data were over 6 times as likely under the 
null hypothesis as under the alternative hypotheses. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant, all ps > .36. These results therefore failed to support the 
claim that rTPJ is selectively involved in processing the spontaneous representation of 
another’s visual perspective during self-perspective judgements.  
 
Figure 4. Mean RTs for each stimulation site during self-perspective 
judgements. The light bar represents consistent trials and the dark bars illustrate 
inconsistent trials. The error bars illustrate within-subject S.E.M. 
 
The above analysis did, however, show a main effect of stimulation site when 
only the self-perspective judgement trials were included.  Responses were slower for 
the rTPJ compared to the MOC stimulation site.  This is consistent with a domain-
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general attentional role for rTPJ on self-perspective trials. In order to investigate if this 
effect was selective to self-perspective compared to non-self-perspective trials, 
consistent with the task-demand analyses above, in our next analysis we included the 
non-self-perspective trials. The 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA (factors as in the above analysis, 
with the addition of Perspective: self, non-self) revealed a significant main effect of 
Perspective, F(1,18) = 29.33; p < .001; η
2
p= .62.  Overall, responses were faster for self 
(M = 626 ms, S.E.M. = 31) than for non-self trials (M = 673 ms, S.E.M. = 36). Again, the 
main effect of Consistency remained significant, F(1,18) = 40.47; p < .001; η
2
p= .69. 
Neither the main effects of Stimulus Type (p = .52) nor Stimulation Site (p = .23) were 
significant.  However, there was a significant interaction between the Stimulation Site 
and Perspective factors, F(1,18) = 8.80; p = .008; η
2
p= .33, supported by a Bayes factor of 
3.14 in favour of inclusion of the Stimulation Site × Perspective interaction (when 
averaging over all models containing the interaction compared to all other models).  
Post-hoc analysis revealed that under stimulation of the rTPJ, RTs for self-perspective 
trials were slower than under MOC stimulation, F(1,18) = 4.60; p = .046; η
2
p= .20, see 
Figure 5 (although it should be noted that a Bayesian analysis revealed only anecdotal 
evidence for this follow-up test, with a Bayes Factor of 1.51 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis of an effect of stimulation on these trials). The equivalent comparison for 
non-self-perspective trials was not significant (p = .95, Bayes Factor of 0.238 
associated with the alternative hypothesis of an effect of stimulation on these trials). 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance. The results from this 
analysis are therefore consistent with the hypothesis that the rTPJ’s involvement in 
the dots task is in domain-general attentional processing on self-perspective trials, 
irrespective of whether the central stimulus is an avatar or an arrow. 
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Figure 5. Stimulation Site × Perspective interaction. Mean RT during rTMS of rTPJ 
(darker bars) and MOC (lighter bars) for self-perspective and non-self-perspective 
judgements. Compared to MOC, stimulation of rTPJ significantly increased RTs for self-
perspective judgements. The error bars illustrate within-subject S.E.M. 
 
General Discussion 
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 replicate previous findings (Cole et al., 2016; 
Conway et al., 2017; MacDorman, Srinivas & Patel, 2013; Santiesteban et al., 2014, 
Schurz et al., 2015) that a non-mentalistic stimulus such as an arrow is able to elicit a 
consistency effect of similar magnitude to that of a human-like figure in the dots task. 
Of course, it is possible that equivalent consistency effects in the mentalistic and non-
mentalistic conditions arise through different mechanisms: implicit mentalizing in the 
avatar condition, and domain-general attentional processing in the arrow condition. 
This question was investigated here using neurostimulation methods to test the 
competing predictions of two hypotheses: that the role of the rTPJ in the dots task is 
to support implicit mentalizing in the mentalistic condition; or, that recruitment of the 
rTPJ during performance of the dots task relates to domain-general attentional 
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processes, occurring on self-perspective trials irrespective of whether the central 
stimulus is mentalistic or not. Results supported the second hypothesis: stimulation of 
rTPJ selectively impacted self-perspective versus non-self-perspective trials, but did 
not distinguish between mentalistic and non-mentalistic trials. 
An attentional explanation of rTPJ involvement on self-perspective trials is 
consistent with a large body of literature demonstrating the role of the TPJ in several 
aspects of attention. The role of the TPJ in attentional reorienting is well-established; 
for example, TPJ activity is observed on invalid trials of the Posner (1980) attentional 
cuing task (which require attentional reorienting) but not on valid trials (Thiel, Zilles & 
Fink, 2004). One suggestion put forward in the Introduction was that, on self- but not 
on non-self-perspective trials, participants must reorient their attention from the side 
of the room cued by the arrow or avatar in order to check for more dots on the other 
side of the room. However, other rTPJ-mediated attentional processes are also 
possible explanations of the effects of stimulation on self-perspective trials. Previous 
studies have consistently found TPJ recruitment during visual pop-out tasks, where a 
target ‘pops out’ because of its saliency and novelty when surrounded by distracting 
stimuli (Buschman & Miller, 2007; Ellison et al., 2004; Pollmann et al., 2003).  In the 
dots task, it is possible that the saliency of the targets (large red dots against a light 
blue background) makes them ‘pop-out’ and they are quickly subitized (Sathian et al., 
1999). On self-perspective trials this TPJ-mediated attentional selection of all the dots 
would be helpful; but on non-self-perspective trials, such attentional selection of all 
red dot targets would be counterproductive. It is possible, therefore, that stimulation 
of the rTPJ interfered with efficient target selection on self-perspective trials, resulting 
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in slower performance due to a reduced ‘pop-out’ effect, but did not affect non-self-
perspective trials on which ‘pop out’ processes do not govern performance.  
It should be noted therefore that the lack of stimulation effects on non-self-
perspective trials does not imply that domain-general attentional processes are not 
required in this type of trial. Non-self-perspective trials are indeed likely to rely on 
domain-general attentional processes, but these processes may not involve 
recruitment of rTPJ. In order to establish which processes are involved in these trials it 
is again informative to consider the demands of the task on these trials. Recall that, 
before making their responses, participants are presented with a perspective cue.  For 
non-self-perspective trials, the cue is ‘She’, ‘He’, or ‘Arrow’. So, before they see the 
picture of the room with the dots, on non-self-perspective trials (unlike on self-
perspective trials) participants know they have to pay attention to the direction of the 
central stimulus and verify the number of dots to which the avatar is facing or the 
arrow is pointing.  The presence of the perspective cue before non-self-perspective 
judgements renders this trial type similar to a ‘valid’ trial in the Posner task (Posner, 
1980).  For valid trials of the Posner task, the location of a prime cue and the target 
stimulus is the same.  This type of trial requires endogenous orienting of attention to 
the cued location. Previous neuroimaging research has found that this type of 
attentional orienting during valid trials of the Posner task engages the anterior 
cingulate cortex (Thiel et al., 2004), whereas attentional re-orienting during invalid 
trials (where the location of the prime cue differs from the target’s location) recruits 
rTPJ.  This could explain why performance on non-self-perspective trials in the dots 
task remains unaffected following stimulation of the rTPJ.  
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Finally, there is another possible explanation for the lack of a selective effect of 
rTPJ stimulation on avatar and arrow trials: that participants were 
anthropomorphising the arrow stimulus and treating it as if it had mental states. We 
have previously argued against such an explanation (Santiesteban et al., 2014); 
furthermore, such an effect, if present, may be more likely for those participants who 
saw the avatar stimulus before the arrow stimulus, and yet there were no signs of 
stimulus order effects in either this study or in earlier studies with avatar and arrow 
stimuli (Conway et al., 2017; Santiesteban et al., 2014). Perhaps more convincingly, 
this possibility was directly investigated by Conway et al. (2017) who used a variant of 
the dots task which is able to detect the attribution of mental states to either the 
avatar or arrow stimulus should it occur. Specifically, participants completed the 
standard arrow or avatar conditions of the task but either an opaque or a transparent 
telescope was used to render dots in front of the avatar invisible or not; assuming the 
anthropomorphising explanation is true, the same would be true for the arrow. With 
such a design, implicit mentalizing would be revealed by the presence of the standard 
consistency effect in the visible condition, but an absence of the consistency effect in 
the invisible condition. In fact, a consistency effect was observed in all conditions, a 
pattern of data which does not support the implicit mentalizing account (and which is 
therefore also inconsistent with the anthropomorphising account of the consistency 
effect in the arrow condition), but which is instead consistent with a domain-general 
attentional account of performance on the dots task. 
It is also important to clarify that our interpretation that performance on the 
dots task is likely to be mediated by domain-general attentional processes subserved 
by the rTPJ does not undermine or negate the well-established role of this brain region 
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in the social domain, and particularly in mentalizing processes. There is converging 
empirical evidence that the rTPJ is a functionally heterogeneous brain region (Scholz 
et al., 2009; Mars et al., 2012; Bzdok et al., 2013; Igelström et al., 2015; Krall et al., 
2015, 2016; Lee & McCarthy, 2016). For example, a recent meta-analysis by Krall et al. 
(2015) of neuroimaging data from attention reorienting and false belief studies 
showed recruitment of the anterior subregion of the rTPJ in both types of task, 
whereas higher activation was found in the posterior rTPJ for false belief compared to 
attention reorienting tasks.  These findings were supported by meta-analytic 
connectivity mapping and resting-state functional connectivity analyses, which 
converged on the separation of the rTPJ into anterior (x = 54, y = - 44, z = 18) and 
posterior (x = 54 , y = -52, z = 26) subdivisions.  The stimulated portion of the rTPJ in 
the current study lies on the border of these anterior and posterior subdivisions. 
According to the findings of Krall et al., therefore, this area supports both attentional 
and social processing.  This makes it an ideal target for the present study because 
disruptive stimulation of this area had the capacity for interference with both social 
and attentional processes, allowing us to distinguish between the two hypotheses 
concerning rTPJ function during the dots task, on the basis of the pattern of effects of 
disruptive stimulation that we found. If rTPJ function during the dots task supports 
mentalizing then one would expect a selective effect of rTPJ stimulation only for trials 
with mentalistic stimuli (avatar trials). Conversely, if rTPJ function during the dots task 
supports attentional processes such as visual pop-out or attention reorienting that are 
required on self-perspective but not non-self-perspective trials, then one would 
expect a selective effect of rTPJ stimulation on self-perspective trials (both arrow and 
avatar), but not on non-self-perspective trials. The finding that only self-perspective 
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(but not non-self-perspective) trials for both mentalistic and non-mentalistic 
conditions were affected by rTMS of this subregion of the rTPJ strongly supports the 
view that mentalizing is not required in the dots task.  
 In summary, the findings reported here provide further evidence of the 
robustness of the self-consistency effect in the dots task.  However, rather than 
supporting the view that this effect is driven by participants automatically adopting 
the perspective of the other person in the room, as claimed under the implicit 
mentalizing account, two key findings in our study indicate that domain-general 
attentional processes mediate performance on this task.  The first is the replication of 
previous findings that a non-mentalistic stimulus - an arrow - is as effective as a 
mentalistic stimulus - an avatar - to elicit the self-consistency effect (Cole et al., 2016; 
Conway et al., 2017; MacDorman et al., 2013; Santiesteban et al., 2014).  Crucially, 
here we demonstrate using a causal brain stimulation technique that the right TPJ 
does not distinguish between the mentalistic and non-mentalistic nature of the 
stimulus producing the consistency effect.  The second finding, that disruption of the 
right TPJ impairs performance only during self-perspective trials (for both mentalistic 
and non-mentalistic stimuli), suggests that rather than perspective taking or self-other 
processing per se, the dots task taps into domain-general attentional effects. Hence, 
our results lend support to the view that often what is perceived as mentalizing in 
everyday social interactions is instead mediated by domain-general processes, or sub-
mentalizing (Heyes, 2014b; Santiesteban et al., 2014).  
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Highlights 
 Right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) is claimed to support ‘implicit’ mentalizing 
 We investigated this via repetitive TMS of rTPJ during a perspective-taking task 
 Stimulation did not distinguish between mentalistic and non-mentalistic stimuli 
 Instead, it affected trials as a function of the attentional processes required 
 Attentional processes, not implicit mentalizing, mediate performance on this task 
